Cashing In on Cyberpower

How Interdependent Actors Seek Economic Outcomes in a Digital World

Mark Peters

Peters analyzes 198 cyber events and three case studies, discussing their area of effect, targeting intent, method, and attribution to elucidate the complex narrative of cyber strategy and its influence on economic power outcomes.
Publication date:
May 2018
Publisher :
Potomac Books, Inc.
Format Available     Quantity Price
ISBN : 9781640120136

Dimensions : 230 X 150 mm
Available in 3-4 weeks


• Explains the complex narrative of asymmetric cyberpower as it is used in national politics around the world
• Elucidates and correlates 198 cyber events and their economic outcomes
• Fills a knowledge gap by providing a solid, understandable approach to cyberspace strategy
• Book matches specific events over the past ten years to verifiable methods employed in cyberspace
• Mark Peters is a career cyberspace intelligence officer with a Ph.D. in strategic studies who has been deployed to support Operations ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, NOBLE EAGLE, SOUTHERN WATCH, and UNIFIED PROTECTOR

Over recent centuries, nations struggling for increased power over their neighbors sought mainly symmetric advantages, using clearly defined strategies to crush enemies using military force, coercion, and domination. In recent years, however, as the world becomes increasingly digitally interconnected, military leaders are ditching such symmetric power plays in favor of cyber strategies. Emerging from an interdependent framework, asymmetric cyber strategy confuses national power interaction across the global commons through flow interruptions and the associated difficulty in attributing influences. Clearly identifying state and non-state actors who use cyber means for economic manipulation drives Mark Peter's central question, "How do state and non-state actors use cyber means to influence economic power outcomes?”. Using eight hypotheses to develop this central question, Peters analyzes 198 cyber events, discussing their area of effect, targeting intent, method, and attribution. He also explores newly developed case studies depicting the 2012 trade negotiation espionage in the Japanese Trans-Pacific Partnership preparations, the 2015 cyber-attacks on Ukrainian SCADA systems, and the 2010 intellectual property theft of a gold detector design from the Australian Codan corporation. All hypotheses combine to identify new data and provide a concrete baseline depicting how leaders use cyber means to achieve their economic outcomes.