The Folly of Generals

How Eisenhower's Broad Front Strategy Lengthened World War II

David Colley

An examination of mistakes made by the Allied supreme commander General Dwight Eisenhower in 1944-45, and their implication for the shape of the last nine months of World War II.
Publication date:
June 2021
Publisher :
Casemate Publishers
Language:
English
Illustration :
50 photographs
Format Available     Quantity Price
Hardback
ISBN : 9781612009742

Dimensions : 228 X 152 mm
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Overview
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• Exploration of mistakes made by Allied Supreme Commander Eisenhower in the last nine months of the war in Europe
• Draws on post-war interviews with senior German commanders as well as Allied official histories and memoirs
• Examines aspects of the Allied advance that have not previously been explored, such as the American advance at Wallendorf, and Truscott's plan to close the Belfort Gap

Imagine how many lives would have been saved had the war in Europe finished in December 1944 instead of five months later... David Colley analyses critical mistakes made by the Allied supreme commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, in the last nine months of the war. He argues that had Eisenhower been more adept at taking advantage of several potential breakthroughs in the Siegfried Line in the fall of 1944 the war in the European Theatre of Operations might have ended sooner.

The book details the American penetration of the Siegfried Line in mid-September and their advance into Germany at Wallendorf before the troops were called back. It also examines in detail operations in the Stolberg Corridor and the actions of General Lucian Truscott. It compares the battles at Wallendorf and Stolberg with Operation Market Garden, and assesses the effectiveness of these operations and the use of the troops. Eisenhower later called off another operation in November 1944, already in progress, to cross the Rhine and destroy the German 1st Army north of Strasbourg. American and German generals believe this operation would have shortened the war.



The Folly of Generals explores these potential breakthroughs - along with other strategic and tactical mistakes in the ETO and in Italy, some never before revealed - that might have shortened the war by a considerable margin.