Wedemeyer

The Strategist Behind America’s Victory in World War II, and the Prophet of Its Geopolitical Failure in Asia

John J. McLaughlin

Like many heroes of World War II, General Albert C. Wedemeyer's career has been largely overshadowed by such well-known figures as Marshall, Patton, Montgomery and Bradley. Wedemeyer's legacy as the main planner of the D-Day invasion is almost completely forgotten today, eclipsed by politics and the capriciousness of human nature.
Publication date:
March 2012
Publisher :
Casemate Publishers
Language:
English
Illustration :
illustrated section
Format Available     Quantity Price
Hardback
ISBN : 9781612000695

Dimensions : 229 X 152 cm
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£25.00
eBook (ePub)
ISBN : 9781612001067

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£12.99

Overview
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• An intimate look at a visionary thinker who helped guide the Allies to victory in their greatest challenge, but whose vision of the post-war world was unfortunately not heeded

Like many heroes of World War II, General Albert C. Wedemeyer's career has been largely overshadowed by such well-known figures as Marshall, Patton, Montgomery and Bradley. Wedemeyer's legacy as the main planner of the D-Day invasion is almost completely forgotten today, eclipsed by politics and the capriciousness of human nature.

In the late 1930s Wedemeyer had the unique experience of being an exchange student at the German Kriegsakademia, the Nazis’ equivalent of Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff School. As the only American to attend, he was thus the only ranking officer in the US who recognised the revolutionary tactics of Blitzkrieg once they were unleashed, and he knew how to respond.

As US involvement in the European conflagration approached, Wedemeyer was taken under the wing of George C. Marshall in Washington, but although he conceived the plans for US mobilisation, to his great disappointment he was not appointed to field command once the invasion commenced; further, he had run afoul of Winston Churchill due to the latter’s insistence on emphasising the Mediterranean theatre in 1943.

Perhaps because of Churchill’s animosity, Wedemeyer was transferred to the Burma-China theatre, where a year later he would replace General Stilwell. Ultimately, Wedemeyer's service in the Asian theatre became far more significant, though less known. Had the US political establishment listened to Wedemeyer on China during the years 1943-48, it is possible China would not have been lost to the Communists and would have been a functioning US ally from the start, thus eliminating the likelihood of both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.